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IS ANYONE LISTENING TO OUR STUDENTS? A PLEA
FOR RESPECT AND INCLUSION
STUART L. LEVITON*
I. INTRODUCTION
T ODAY'S youth bring many problems with them when they attend
public school: sex, drugs, violence, and despair. In response to
these problems, school administrators have increasingly restricted stu-
dents' rights in the name of the greater good. The United States Su-
preme Court, initially a stalwart defender of students' rights, has
submitted to this trend. At the heart of this Article is an exploration
of the rhetoric used by the Court to justify its acquiescence to and
facilitation of a trend away from a viewpoint hailing the United States
Constitution as a baseline of protected students' rights, and toward a
deferential approach to school administration that requires school
administrators" actions to be merely reasonable, regardless of the stu-
dent right at issue.
Exploration of public high school students' rights2 is hardly an orig-
inal idea. However, this Article is different because it takes a broader
look at the implications of the balancing test enunciated in New Jersey
v. T.L.O.,' a case that addressed, inter alia, the requisite level of sus-
picion needed to conduct a search in a public high school. While
T.L.O. and its First Amendment cousins, Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser4 (student speech) and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier (student press), give lip service to the notion of balancing
the interests of the State and students in the context of the First and
. Associate, Latham and Watkins, Los Angeles, CA (beginning Fall 1993). B.S., The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1987; J.D., The University of Texas School of
Law, 1993.
1. The term "school administrator" is used broadly to include teachers, principals, and
other school officials who interact with and supervise students.
2. This Article is limited to a discussion of students' rights in public secondary schools and
does not include the rights of private secondary school students. This limitation is necessary
because the Constitution is implicated in the school setting only because of State action. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable against public school officials through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Id.
4. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
5. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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Fourth Amendments, they really enunciate a constitutional standard
that requires an evaluation of a school administrator's actions only in
light of a "reasonable educator ' 6 standard. Today, if a school admin-
istrator concludes that a student or his or her belongings should be
searched, or that a school newspaper should be censored, or that a
student's speech should be silenced or sanctioned, the Court will defer
to the administrator as long as a reasonable educator would search,
censor, or silence that student.
Parts II and III of this Article review the Court's de facto sanction-
ing of a broad range of discretionary searches, censorship, and silenc-
ing of students, and the lower courts' deference to school
administrators to the detriment of students' rights. Some might argue
that this is the correct path to take to address the reality presented in
Part IV of this Article. 7 This reasoning is flawed for two reasons: (1)
the lower courts and school administrators often disregard what the
Court insists are students' constitutional rights in public schools;' and
(2) the present approach is not working.
Part V proposes that the Court redefine the students' baseline of
constitutional rights to require, at a minimum, a counterbalancing
force to the reasonable educator in the form of a "reasonable stu-
dent." 9 Under this new test, a true balancing of interests between the
student and the school administrator would be required before a
school administrator could restrict a student's rights. At the very
least, this approach to balancing would require schools to respect the
Court's dictate that public school students have constitutional rights.
Furthermore, but perhaps secondarily for purposes of this Article,
such a requirement has the potential to foster a dialogue between stu-
6. Extrapolating from the Court's reasonableness standard in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, a
"reasonable educator" is defined as follows: A school administrator whose behavior, when eval-
uated under all of the circumstances, could be justified by a representative school administrator
at its inception and is reasonable in scope in light of the particular facts and circumstances that
warranted the behavior at the outset. For the T.L.O. standard, see infra text accompanying note
69.
7. Cf. HOWARD L. HURWITZ, THE LAST ANGRY PRINCIPAL 9 (1988):
Poverty workers and the New York Civil Liberties Union were united in protecting
the right of the vilest miscreant to attend school. They invoked every conceivable pro-
cedure to harass me and other principals in the city. The easy out was to give in to
them. And I must say sadly that it is the easy way out that has driven schools up and
over the wall. I resisted them every inch of the way and was supported by the commu-
nity.
8. See infra text accompanying note 40 for one of the Court's pronouncements on stu-
dents' constitutional rights.
9. Similar to that of a reasonable educator as defined supra note 6, a "reasonable stu-
dent" is defined as follows: A public high school student whose behavior, when evaluated under
all of the circumstances, could be justified by a representative public high school student at its
inception and as actually carried out.
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dents and school administrators currently missing from our public
schools. Perhaps by listening to our students, we can better under-
stand what is truly troubling them, address these issues honestly, and
work together for the mutual good.
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD (AS DEVISED BY THE COURT)
Some believe "the school-not the student-must prescribe the
rules of conduct in an educational institution."10 This view facilitates
the reasonable educator standard" currently being employed by courts
to evaluate students' rights. Courts justify reliance on the reasonable
educator standard by pointing to the schools' responsibility to look
after the welfare of their students. 12 This justification has not changed
over the past fifty years, but what has changed is the rhetoric used by
courts to support the increasing deference to school administrators,
and the concomitant narrowing of students' rights. As a result of the
lower courts' reliance on the reasonable educator standard, school ad-
ministration has become increasingly dictatorial, or at a minimum,
has begun exercising a student-exclusive form of student supervision
and regulation.
This Part traces the development and downfall of students' First
Amendment 3 and Fourth Amendment 4 rights in the public high
schools by reviewing six United States Supreme Court cases: West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,"5 Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,16 Board of Education, Is-
land Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 17 New Jersey v.
10. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 692 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1972)); see also Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("We can all agree that as a matter of educational policy students should have wide access to
information and ideas. But the people elect school boards, who in turn select administrators,
who select the teachers, and these are the individuals best able to determine the substance of that
policy." (emphasis added)).
11. See supra note 6 for the definition of a reasonable educator.
12. See infra text accompanying note 78 (discussing the need for protecting youth against
violence, drugs, and other problems in schools).
13. The First Amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CoNrsT. amend I. This Article looks specifically
at students' rights with respect to speech and the press.
14. The Fourth Amendment reads in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend IV. The scope of searches and seizures is specifically ad-
dressed in this Article. See infra notes 121-29.
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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T.L.O.,1 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,19 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.20 This part explores the development of
students' constitutional rights, with the Court beginning on a highnote
in Barnette," establishing a constitutional baseline in Tinker,22 carry-
ing forward the dictate of Barnette in Pico,3 redefining the baseline in
terms of a reasonableness test 24 in T.L.O., and balancing away stu-
dents' rights in Fraser25 and Kuhlmeier.26 In reviewing this line of
cases, it becomes evident that the Court has become increasingly will-
ing to defer to school administrators on issues of student/administra-
tion interaction. This increasing deference becomes obvious upon
observation of the current shift away from an implicit presumption
favoring students' rights that was advocated in Barnette, Tinker, and
Pico to one implicitly presuming deference to administrators in
T.L.O., Fraser, and Kuhlmeier. The judicial branch's increasing pas-
sivity and implicit shift in presumptions will be the focus of this cri-
tique.
A. Respect: Barnette, Tinker, and Pico
Barnette, Tinker, and Pico each have victorious students in com-
mon. Their theme is one of respect for students as individuals deserv-
ing constitutional protection regardless of the exigencies of the
moment or of the surroundings. While each of these opinions contains
caveats that limit students' rights, the underlying principle of each
opinion is a warning to school administrators that limits exist on both
the amount and the kind of regulations and restrictions that can be
imposed on students.
It is a tribute to the Court that during a World War the Court
would nevertheless strike down, in West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette,27 parts of a state statute requiring students to salute
the American flag. 2 The Court noted the importance of recognizing
and protecting students' constitutional rights because the public
schools "are educating the young for citizenship [and this] is reason
18. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
19. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
20. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 27-32.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 62-74.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 81-99.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 100-08.
27. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. Id. at 626 (citation omitted).
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for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ-
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." ' 29 The Court reviewed the dangers of attempting to "co-
erce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essen-
tial," ' 30 and concluded that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." '3' This is one example of an implicit presumption of stu-
dents' constitutional rights and the Court's resolve to preserve them.
The Court's defense of students' rights and its opposition to coer-
cive tactics foster a view of the Constitution as a baseline, deviations
below which we will not tolerate and above which we constantly
strive.32 While Barnette establishes the principle of a baseline, it does
not clearly define it for all purposes. This uncertainty sparked a de-
bate involving the following core issues which have been contested
over the fifty years since Barnette: Exactly what does it mean to have
a baseline, what is protected and what is not, and who decides? It is
enough to mention at this point that Barnette indicated that students
possess constitutional rights that must be respected by school adminis-
trators. Barnette also presented what is perhaps the most inclusive,
respectful, and deferential view of students' rights-according stu-
dents powerful protection under the Constitution, and refusing to al-
low school administrators, even reasonable ones, to invade a sphere of
protected students' rights.
If Barnette established the principle of a constitutional baseline,
Tinker33 further refined it and provided an implicit balancing test for
determining which rights are protected and which are not. In Tinker,
several students attempted to express their disapproval of the Vietnam
War by wearing black armbands to their respective schools.3 4 The
schools attempted to suppress the demonstrations by suspending the
29. Id. at 637. Note that Justice Jackson refers to students as the "young" or "youth,"
rather than children, as do later Courts. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 70 (T.L.O.);
infra text accompanying note 89 (Fraser). This reference is interpreted as affording more respect
to students than the reference to children.
30. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.
31. Id. at 642 (footnote omitted).
32. Cf. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982) ("[W]e have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the States and local school
boards in matters of education must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcen-
dent imperatives of the First Amendment.").
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. Id. at 504.
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students involved. 5 The Court, in supporting the students' right to
protest, held that proscription of speech and expression was justified
only if a school could show that the proscribed speech or expression
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, ' 3 6 or that the
activity in question would "impinge upon the rights of other stu-
dents. "7
Tinker's elaboration on and justification of protecting students'
constitutional freedoms was powerful.3" The Court began with a
straightforward statement: "It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 3 9 The Court further noted:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are
"persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the StateA0
35. Id.
36. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
37. Id.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-42. Some commentators acknowledge the long
tradition of court-employed rhetoric, but discount its long-term significance, at least in the case
of youth. See William S. Geimer, Juvenileness: A Single-Edged Constitutional Sword, 22 GA. L.
REv. 949, 949-50 (1988) ("Supreme Court cases have been characterized by declarations, often
accompanied by soaring rhetoric, that the constitutional guarantee at issue is indeed available to
juveniles. However, the Court also employs what I call 'juvenileness' to reach the conclusion
that the young person loses.") (footnote omitted). Geimer continues by stating:
Why the Court continues to insist that the Bill of Rights is facially applicable to
juveniles is a mystery. The ingredients of juvenileness could easily form the rationale
of a definitive opinion holding that, until adulthood, juveniles are committed to the
sound discretion of adults, protected officially by the sound discretion of those bas-
tions of orthodoxy, the state legislatures and the United States Congress. Such a pro-
nouncement would have the virtue of candor, would enhance the integrity of
constitutional discourse, and would more accurately reflect reality.
Id. at 953.
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. This line has been adopted, in whole or in part, by each of the
succeeding principle cases that are discussed in this Article. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In an often quoted statement, the Court said that
students do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."') (quoting Tinker,
393 U.S. at 506); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). Note that in Pico, Justice Brennan, citing Tinker,
stated, "'First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to . . .students.' Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982).
40. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.
Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be
exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided
as a safe haven for crackpots.
4 1
The Court concluded that "[tihe vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools. '42
Tinker carried forward Barnette's emphasis on protecting students'
rights, and enunciated a test by which these rights could be deter-
mined. While students were not given free reign in the public schools,
they were included as an integral part of the school setting, and their
views were to be tolerated, if not always respected. The Court under-
stood that, as an educational institution, schools can teach as much by
example as they can by what they expressly say. A school administra-
tor's respect for students' rights demonstrates to students that it is
important to respect the Constitution and its dictates, regardless of
the circumstances of the moment.
Pico 43 is the last case discussed in which the students win. Pico in-
volved a question of how much control a school board can exercise
41. Id. at 513. A New Jersey Superior Court judge argued a similar point in T.L.O., in the
context of the Fourth Amendment:
Although the trial judge in the opinion which has been adopted by my colleagues
gave lip service to the Fourth Amendment, he applied the diminished standard of rea-
sonableness in such a way as to render the protection of the Fourth Amendment virtu-
ally unavailable to juveniles in public schools who are suspected of violation of school
regulations.
State ex rel. T.L.O., 448 A.2d 493, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (Joelson, J.A.D.,
dissenting).
42. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)). Justice Brennan preached the same message in T.L.O.; however, it fell on deaf ears:
Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform their conduct to the
Fourth Amendment's protections of personal privacy and personal security....
[Tlhis principle is of particular importance when applied to schoolteachers, for chil-
dren learn as much by example as by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to
charge teachers with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our
system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same
teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353-54 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens also echoed this sentiment in T.L.O.:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of
rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. If the Nation's students can be
convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they
cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly.
Id. at 373-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
43. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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over the removal of books" from a public school's libraries. 45 The
Court, after reviewing Barnette and Tinker,"6 stated that the rule
which evolved from those cases is simply that "First Amendment
rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment, are available to ... students." 47 The Court concluded that
students' constitutional rights were "directly and sharply implicated
by the removal of books from the shelves of a school library,"4 that
"the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amend-
ment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge, ' 49 and that stu-
dents have a "right to receive information and ideas." 50
The Court's justification for this holding was that "just as access to
ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of
free speech and press in a meaningful manner, such access prepares
students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often
contentious society in which they will soon be adult members."'" The
Court further noted that 'students must always remain free to in-
quire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand-
ing.' The school library is the principal locus of such freedom. ' 52
In summary, Barnette, Tinker, and Pico stand for these proposi-
tions: (1) public school students presumptively possess constitutional
rights; (2) school administrators must respect these rights unless a stu-
dent "materially and substantially" interferes with discipline
generally 53 or "impinge[s] upon the rights of other students" ;54
(3) school administrators cannot limit student activities for political
reasons; and (4) there are valid educational purposes, such as setting
the proper example, for respecting students' constitutional rights.
These cases create a sphere of rights that must be respected. As an
44. The following books were subject to the school board's removal: ELDRIDGE CLEAVER,
SOUL ON ICE (1968); ALICE CHILDRESS, A HERO AIN'T NoTIoN' BUT A SANDWICH (1973); BER-
NARD MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966); Go ASK ALICE, of anonymous authorship (1972); KURT
VONNEGUT, JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1969); Tm BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS
(Langston Hughes ed., 1967); RICHIARD WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); OIIVER LAFARGE, LAUGH-
INO Boy (1929); DESMOND MORRIS, THE NAKED APE (1967); Ptuu THOmAS, DowN THESE MEAN
STREETS (1967); and A READER FOR WRITERS (Jerome Archer ed., 1962). Id. at 856-57 n.3.
45. Id. at 863.
46. Id. at 865-66.
47. Id. at 866 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
50. Id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
51. Id. at 868.
52. Id. at 868-69 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
54. Id.
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educational matter, they suggest that there is independent educational
justification for respecting constitutional rights.
Chief Justice Burger's framing of the issue in his dissent in Pico can
now be recognized as a harbinger of how the Court has evaluated
school cases since Pico:
Stripped to its essentials, the issue comes down to two important
propositions: first, whether local schools are to be administered by
elected school boards, or by federal judges and teenage pupils; and
second, whether the values of morality, good taste, and relevance to
education are valid reasons for school board decisions .. .55
In T.L.O. ,36 Fraser,5 7 and Kuhlmeier s5 the Court becomes increas-
ingly deferential to school administrators. 9 Students' enjoyment of a
baseline of constitutional rights is diminished. The Court's deference
to school administrators inevitably results in decisions that conclude-
school wins, students lose. 60
B. Disregard: T.L.O., Fraser, and Kuhlmeier
During the 1980s, except for Pico, the Court's attitude toward stu-
dents' rights changed and the implicit presumption in favor of pro-
tecting students' rights shifted to one of deference to school
administrators. Students started losing when "reasonableness" be-
came part of the vernacular, which began with T.L.O. in the context
of the Fourth Amendment, and continued in Fraser and Kuhimeier in
the context of the First Amendment. 6' Even more interesting than the
55. Pico, 457 U.S. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
57. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
58. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
59. See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CAs.. L. REV. 1271, 1288 (1991) ("[Tlhe Kuhimeier standard's protection of
student speech is significantly more deferential to school authorities than the Tinker stan-
dard .... ).
60. See id. at 1275 ("[T]he practical effect of the judicial deference to school officials ex-
pressed in Kuhlmeier leaves little real protection for student expression not approved by school
authorities." (footnote omitted)).
61. Some may argue that students should lose. Many see one function of schools as that of
a value-inculcating institution. See, e.g., id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The public school
conveys to our young the information and the tools required not merely to survive in, but to
contribute to, civilized society. It also inculcates in tomorrow's leaders the 'fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system .... "') (citing Ambach v. Nor-
wick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1969)). As such, the school administrator should be allowed to shape and
mold the minds of students. See, e.g., id. at 273 ("This standard [Kuhlmeier] is consistent with
our oft-expressed view that the education of our Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
STUDENTS' RIGHTS
reality of fewer students' rights is the justification the Court advances
for allowing this new reality.
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 62 introduced an explicit balancing test for
evaluating students' constitutional rights. In T.L.O., an assistant vice
principal searched a fourteen-year-old high school girl's purse because
he suspected that she had been smoking in the rest room.6 3 The search
was initially intended to secure evidence that would show that T.L.O.
had been smoking, and that she was lying to the assistant vice princi-
pal when she denied doing so.64 The search went beyond this, how-
ever, and the assistant vice principal discovered cigarette rolling
papers, a "small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty
plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an
index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O.
money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana deal-
ing." 65 T.L.O. was suspended from school for three days for smoking
in the rest room6' and the state brought delinquency charges against
her. 67
The Court, unlike in previous cases in which it upheld students'
constitutional rights, concluded that while schools must "accommo-
date the privacy interests of schoolchildren[, because of] . . . the sub-
stantial need of teachers and administrators . . .[to have the] freedom
to maintain order in the schools [, the Constitution] does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable
cause .... "68 The Court enunciated a reasonableness test to define
the new constitutional baseline:
[Tlhe legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges."). While all of
this might be true, it nevertheless ignores the dictate of Tinker, which re-iterated the notion from
Barnette that the Constitution represents a baseline for students' rights that must be respected.
The present situation also ignores the test in T.L.O., which requires, at a minimum, a balancing
of interests.
62. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
63. Id. at 328.
64. Id.
65. Id. The substantial amount of money was "$40.98 in single dollar bills and change."
State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (N.J. Juv. & Domestic Rel. Ct. 1980). While one
might concede that forty singles is unusual, it is this type of language, i.e., "substantial quantity
of money," that lends credence to the notion that adults use hyberbole to support their points.
See Geimer, supra note 38.
66. T.L.O.,469U.S.at329n.l.
67. id. at 329.
68. Id. at 341.
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inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the ... action was
justified at its inception[.J" . . . [Second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.'"69
The Court's willingness to re-examine the constitutional baseline
and its formulation of the two interests balanced in T.L.O. represent
a change in the conception of students' rights. On the one hand, the
Court says that there must be an "accommodation of the privacy in-
terests of schoolchildren,' 70 but on the other it says that this must be
balanced against a "substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools."'" The Court further
notes that it has previously "recognized that maintaining security and
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
disciplinary procedures, and [it] ha[s] respected the value of preserv-
ing the informality of the student-teacher relationship. '72
The T.L.O articulation of the baseline of students' constitutional
rights is a far cry from Barnette (a "fixed star in our constitutional
constellation") 73 and Tinker ("[S]tudents . . .[do not] shed their con-
stitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate."). 74 Arguably, the
T.L.O. language could be interpreted as a reclassification of students'
rights from a constitutional baseline to one of an accommodating
grant. While the Court insists that students retain constitutional pro-
tections, if students' rights are merely accommodated, but are not
based on a constitutional grounding, school administrators could eas-
ily argue that what has been given can be taken away.
The change from Barnette, Tinker, and Pico to T.L. 0. is most evi-
dent in the newfound reliance on "flexibility" in determining the con-
stitutional baseline of students' rights. In Barnette, the Court was
unwilling to be flexible in light of World War II, and refused to man-
date forced salutation of the flag. The Tinker Court similarly was un-
69. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). This is a very broad standard. As
commentators have pointed out, this is troubling in light of the Court's uncertainty as to the
applicability of an individualized suspicion requirement. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Pri-
vacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid
Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REv. 897, 925-46 (1988) (discussing the need for
an individualized suspicion requirement and examining other potential dangers of requiring only
a generalized suspicion).
70. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 339-40 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975)).
73. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (footnote omitted).
74. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1966).
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willing to yield in light of the Vietnam Conflict and allow censorship
of expression. Furthermore, the Pico Court was unwilling to accede to
the conservative tide sweeping across the country during the early
1980s and permit suppression of ideas based on political ideology.
Why should such flexibility be embraced now?
Part of the reason behind the Court's holding in T.L.O. was a con-
flict among the Court's concerns for maintaining order in a chaotic
world, upholding students' constitutional rights, and calling for re-
laxed procedural and substantive safeguards in administering the pub-
lic schools. After highlighting problems in public schools, the Court
concluded that informal measures were appropriate to combat this
hostile environment. 71 It believed that the accompanying relaxation of
student constitutional protections was minimal because the school ad-
ministrators were acting in their students' best interests. 76 Note, how-
ever, that if informality were the solution, our schools should already
be showing improvement because most courts prior to T.L.O. either
had adopted a "reasonableness" approach to the Fourth Amendment
or had held that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable in the
school setting. 71 If anything, the Court's formulation of reasonable-
ness actually adds formality to the school search proceedings in many
states.
Justice Blackmun may have captured best the bottom line in
T.L.O.:
[B]ecause drug use and possession of weapons have become
increasingly common among young people, an immediate response
frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive
to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school
personnel .... 18
... [Tleacher[s,] ha[ving] neither the training nor the day-to-day
experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law
75. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40.
76. See id. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Rarely does this type of adversarial rela-
tionship [similar to police and criminalsl exist between school authorities and pupils. Instead,
there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical
teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education.")
(footnote omitted).
77. See id. at 332 n.2 (discussing the three approaches to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
relating to schools prior to T.L.O.).
78. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice White, writing for the Court, com-
mented similarly, stating, "By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the stan-
dard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of
reason and common sense." Id. at 343.
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enforcement officer possesses .... [are] ill-equipped to make a quick
judgment about the existence of probable cause. 79
Is not Justice Blackmun implicitly saying that it is simply too compli-
cated to embrace student concerns, and that deference to school ad-
ministrators is easier to administer and therefore worthy of
constitutional approval? The problem with this interpretation is the
message it sends to students. While the Court cites the language in
Barnette discussing the importance of protecting students' rights,80
T.L.O. does not result in respect for students' rights.
While T.L.O. introduced a balancing test for weighing students'
Fourth Amendment constitutional rights, the Court's rhetoric became
even more pronounced in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,8 a
case involving a high school student who delivered a nominating
speech before about six hundred of his peers at a school assembly for
a fellow student who was running for student office.8 2 In characteriz-
ing the speech, the Court stated that "[d]uring the entire speech,
Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor." 3 After Fraser's speech, he "was . . . in-
formed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name
would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker
at the school's commencement exercises." 4 Interestingly enough,
while the school was attempting to silence Matthew Fraser, his fellow
students elected him to give the commencement address at graduation,
79. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But cf. Floyd G. Delon & Greg L. Gettings, The
Post-T.L.O. Status of Search and Seizure Policies and Practices in Public Schools, 45 EDuc. L.
REP. 461 (1988) (discussing the results of a survey conducted of high school principals in which a
majority of respondents indicated that they were familiar with T.L.O. and the legal standard
enunciated).
80. See id. at 334. The Court cites to the Barnette language quoted in the text accompany-
ing note 29.
81. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
82. Id. at 677.
83. Id. at 677-78. It was left to Justice Brennan, who concurred in the judgment, to tell us
what Fraser actually said:
'I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his charac-
ter is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
'Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
'Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one
of you.
'So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.'
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Appellant's Brief at 47).
84. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
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which he eventually delivered. 5 Justice Stevens noted this twist of
events in his dissent:
This respondent was an outstanding young man with a fine
academic record. The fact that he was chosen by the student body to
speak at the school's commencement exercises demonstrates that he
was respected by his peers .... It indicates that he was probably in a
better position to determine whether an audience composed of 600 of
his contemporaries would be offended by the use of a four-letter
word-or a sexual metaphor-than is a group of judges who are at
least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the
crime. 6
The Court, however, concluded emphatically that "[tihe determina-
tion of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly
is inappropriate properly rests with the school board." 87 This standard
endorses nearly total deference to school administrators and embraces
the reasonable educator as the test of permissible school administrator
action. In a footnote, Justice Stevens chided the majority for not giv-
ing enough credit to the intelligence and ability of a high school audi-
ence to understand a message and implicitly argued that the Court was
not giving sufficient weight to the "reasonable student."8 8 Justice
Stevens stated,
In its opinion today, the Court describes respondent as a
"confused boy," and repeatedly characterizes his audience of high
school students as "children." When a more orthodox message is
being conveyed to a similar audience, four Members of today's
majority would treat high school students like college students rather
than like children.8 9
The Court attempts to justify its actions by discussing the "role and
purpose of the American public school system,"' 9 but unsatisfactorily
describes how this has changed sufficiently to alter the test of stu-
dents' protected rights:
[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as
85. Id. at 679.
86. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 683.
88. Id. at 692 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534
(1986) (dissenting opinions)).
90. Id. at 681.
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values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.9'
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse .92
But what has changed since Barnette? The Barnette Court would
probably have fully agreed with the Fraser Court's statement up until
the word "surely." It also might have agreed with the prohibition on
vulgarity and offensive language. But "vulgarity" and "offensive"
are conclusions, not constitutional tests. Contrary to Fraser, however,
the Barnette Court rejected the notion that a school or the State could
enforce an orthodoxy on its students. 93 Was Fraser's sexual innuendo
sufficiently more serious than World War II to change the Court's
analysis of students' First Amendment rights? Was the alleged poten-
tial harm to adolescent females94 more serious than the survival of our
Nation? Something else is going on: a shift in deference to "reasona-
ble" educators.
The Fraser Court justified its deference to school administrators by
patronizingly asserting what students think without allowing the stu-
dents to speak for themselves. The Court postulated that "[the perva-
sive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to both
teachers and students-indeed to any mature person. ' ' 9 The Court
states that "[bly glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content,
the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students.'"' The Court
also suggested that "[tihe speech could well be seriously damaging to
its less mature audience, many of whom were only [fourteen] years
old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.' 197
91. Id. (citing CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEw BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)). For similar rhetoric, see Desmond Lee, Introduction to PLATO, THE REPUB-
LIC 11, 38 (Desmond Lee trans., 2d ed. rev. 1974) ("Plato was as concerned to train the charac-
ter as the mind, and throughout the account of the secondary stage of education he is insistent
that its object is moral training as much as intellectual ....
92. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
93. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
94. See text accompanying notes. 95-99.
95. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. Arguably the speech could not have been too offensive to many
students, given that Fraser ultimately delivered a commencement speech after being elected as a
write-in candidate by his peers. Id. at 679.
96. Id. at 683 (citing Appellant's Brief at 77-81). It is interesting that the Court should cite
to the Appellant's brief to find a potential harm to justify intrusion on students' constitutional
rights. If the Court allows the school to both define the harm and the remedy, students will be
left with no rights at all.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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However, the Court could not document any harm to the students
attending the assembly.9 Justice Brennan, discussing the lack of evi-
dence, states in his concurrence:
The Court speculates that the speech was "insulting" to female
students, and "seriously damaging" to 14-year-olds, so that school
officials could legitimately suppress such expression in order to
protect these groups. There is no evidence in the record that any
students, male or female, found the speech "insulting." . . . Indeed,
to my mind, respondent's speech was no more "obscene," "lewd,"
or "sexually explicit" than the bulk of programs currently appearing
on prime time television or in the local cinema. 9
The result in Fraser is likely reflective of what reasonable educators
think. The questions no one seems to be asking, however, are: (1) Is
this reflective of reasonable students? and (2) Does it matter? If Bar-
nette, Tinker, and Pico are taken seriously, these questions do matter.
If Matthew Fraser's classmates are taken seriously in their vote for
him as graduation speaker, this censorial result does not represent
their views either. Matthew Fraser learned the lesson firsthand that
under the reasonable educator standard, the school wins and the stu-
dent loses.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier0" is the final case in this
line and represents the greatest deference to the reasonable educator.
Kuhlmeier "concern[ed] the extent to which educators may exercise
editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper pro-
duced as part of the school's journalism curriculum." 10' Kuhlmeier
has been more succinctly, and perhaps more accurately, described as a
case "upholding censorship of a school-sponsored student newspa-
per.' 102 One of the stories [ultimately editorially-controlled out of
publication] "described three Hazelwood East students' experiences
with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students
98. See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99, Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). It is interesting that Justice Brennan refers to
the arts. As discussed in the context of the television show Beverly Hills, 90210, infra Part IV,
sex and sexuality are exactly what many youths are aware of and interested in.
100. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
101. Id. at 262. Note the use by Justice White of the euphemism "editorial control," rather
than the more precise and exact term "censorship," which is ultimately at issue in this case. See
id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the principal in this case "violated the First
Amendment's prohibitions against censorship of any student expression that neither disrupts
classwork nor invades the rights of others, and against any censorship that is not narrowly tai-
lored to serve its purpose").
102. Bush ex rel. Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D. Minn.
1990).
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at the school."' 13 One justification for the principal's exercising such
editorial control was that "[hie . . . believed that the articles' refer-
ences to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some
of the younger students."10'
The Court enunciated the following standard in Kuhlmeier:
"[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising edito-
rial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 0 Applying this standard,
the Court concluded,
In sum, we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds'
conclusion that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce article
was suitable for publication in Spectrum. Reynolds could reasonably
have concluded that the students who had written and edited these
articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the
Journalism II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of
controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the
privacy of individuals whose most intimate concerns are to be
revealed in the newspaper, and "the legal, moral, and ethical
restrictions imposed upon journalists within [a] school community"
that includes adolescent subjects and readers. Finally, we conclude
that the principal's decision to delete two pages of Spectrum, rather
than to delete only the offending articles or to require that they be
modified, was reasonable under the circumstances as he understood
them. Accordingly, no violation of First Amendment rights
occurred. 106
It is difficult to quibble with the Court over whether Principal Rey-
nolds acted as a reasonable educator would have acted in this situa-
tion. Or is it? Is there any evidence of actual harm? Is the potentiality
of any such harm now sufficient to censor student speech? 0 7 As with
Fraser, the issue of teenage sexuality is very real, and one which stu-
dents are talking about or acting out. It is ironic, however, that the
Court in Kuhlmeier should cite issues of student privacy to justify cen-
103. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 273.
106. Id. at 276.
107. The concept of potentiality was classically stated by Justice Douglas, in the context of
economic regulation, in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Justice Douglas
discussed what the "legislature might conclude," or what the "legislature might think," id. at
490, without offering any actual evidence of legislative intent. This conjecture was enough to
sustain economic regulations having a rational basis. Is this the level of protection students can
now expect?
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sorship when, in T.L.O., the privacy rights of students are dis-
counted. 101
Furthermore, what message is being sent to students when they are
told that school administrators can act in furtherance of any "legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns?"109 Do they understand what that means?
Does anyone? Government and school administrators are not benevo-
lent dictators. They must be limited by some guiding principle recog-
nizing students' constitutional rights in light of a balance between the
reasonable educator and the reasonable student.
III. THE "REAL WORLD" (AS DEFINED AND (MIS)INTERPRETED BY THE
COURTS)
Evidence that the reasonable educator is indeed the standard today,
and more importantly, that the bottom line in most cases is that
courts will sustain a school's action out of deference to school admin-
istrators, is found in the lower courts' interpretation and application
of the legal rules of T.L.O., Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.110 Schools have
taken T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard and the related concepts of
reasonableness in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, and have liberally applied
them to myriad fact patterns.' Although a few courts have reversed
school administrator's actions," 2 the vast majority of courts defer to
school administrators," 3 resulting in the constitutional baseline being
nearly meaningless.
108. 469 U.S. 325, 357-82 (1985).
109. Kuhtmeier, 484 U.S. at 273.
110. Early commentators were unsure how Fraser and Kuhtmeier would play out in the lower
courts. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes and Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judi-
cial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 343, 395 (1989) ("How
Fraser and [Kuhlmeier's] hands-off policy will play in the educational marketplace and in the
lower courts remains to be seen."). This is not a problem today. See infra notes 111-42 and
accompanying text.
111. See Stuart L. Leviton, The Fourth Amendment in Texas Public High Schools: Friend or
Foe? A Question of Perspective, 6 STATE BAR (TExAs) SECTION REPORT: JUVENILE LAW 5, 12
(Dec. 1992) (reviewing the results of a survey of Texas public high school principals related to
school searches, and relating the comment of one high school principal: "With the crisis today in
schools regarding weapons and drugs-I-like many principals-take reasonable cause to the
bank and interpret it liberally to ensure the safety of our students.").
112. See, e.g., Slotterback ex rel. Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (reversing limitations on the right to distribute nonschool materials on school prop-
erty); In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 80484-1, 733 P.2d 316 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987) (reversing a delinquency adjudication because the principal did not have reasonable suspi-
cion to conduct the search); In re Dumas, 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (suppressing
evidence because a search was too expansive).
113. See infra notes 114-42 and accompanying text.
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Cases decided subsequent to T.L. 0., Fraser, and Kuhlmeier involve
restrictions on student press" 4 and student expression. The expression
cases can be categorized loosely as follows: pure speech restrictions,' 5
protection of student "whistle blowers,""' 6 enforcement of dress
codes," 7 restrictions on artistic productions," 8 control of student elec-
tions," 9 and restrictions on school symbol selection. 120 Once the Court
allowed the baseline to be determined by mere reasonableness, school
administrators and lower courts seized on this new flexible standard
and applied it to restrict student rights in a variety of contexts. While
the Court still insists that students possess constitutional rights, it is
difficult to see what those rights are.
A second line of cases relies on T.L.O. and involves Fourth
Amendment search issues. These cases include searches of all sorts
of student possessions, including students' lockers,' 21 auto-
114. See, e.g., Leeb v. DeLong, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Kuhlmeier) (up-
holding the right of a school to censor a student newspaper on the grounds that the material in
question may be defamatory).
115. See, e.g., Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40, 725 F. Supp. 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (citing
T.L.O.) (upholding a general policy of prior approval by the principal of the distribution of non-
school materials by students on school grounds based on time, place and manner restrictions,
but striking down specific regulations that prohibit the distribution of religious or political litera-
ture); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Minn. 1987) (citing T.L.O.)
(granting the defendants motion for summary judgment in this § 1983 action, holding that the
student's First Amendment rights were not violated when students were suspended for distribut-
ing an unofficial school newspaper, a suspension justified by school officials on the grounds
"that distribution of Tour de Farce materially disrupted school activities, that the publication
contain[ed] vulgar and indecent language, and that the publication advocated violence against
teachers."). But see Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 299 (citing T.L.O.) (striking down in part
regulations limiting a student's right to distribute nonschool materials on school property).
116. See Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing T.L.O.)
(upholding the dismissal of a complaint, holding that a student's due process rights were not
violated, even though he was denied, inter alia, the right to know the identity of his student
accusers and cross-examine school administrators who investigated the alleged drug-trafficking
incident that led to his expulsion).
117. See Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp: 820 (N.D. Il1. 1987)
(citing Fraser) (upholding the constitutionality of a school anti-gang rule that prohibited the
wearing of earrings by male students).
118. See Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986) (citing Fraser, Kuhimeier)
(upholding the school board's right to prevent students from putting on a production of Runa-
ways).
119. See, e.g., Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (E.D.
Ark. 1990) (citing Kuhlmeier) (dismissing a student complaint challenging the constitutionality of
the student council elections in which he was kept off the ballot because of "legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns").
120. See Crosby ex rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Kuhlrneier)
(upholding the right of a principal to ban the use of the "Johnny Reb" symbol).
121. See, e.g., R.D.L. v. State, 499 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding
a search initiated because a student was suspected of stealing a school clock, but in which over
$3,000 worth of stolen school lunch tickets were discovered); In re S.C. v. State, 583 So. 2d 188
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mobiles,1 22 "fanny packs,"' 123 clothing, 2 4 book bags, 125 purses, 12 6
and the students themselves.' 2 7  Strip searches 28  and drug
(Miss. 1991) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding a search discovering handguns). But see In re Dumas,
515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (citing T.L.O.) (affirming the suppression of evidence of
marijuana possession, holding that while the initial search for cigarettes was warranted, once the
assistant principal obtained the cigarettes, it was unreasonable to continue the search that led to
the discovery of the marijuana). Note that the court in In re Dumas came to the opposite result
of the Court in T.L. 0. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
122. See, e.g., State v. Slattery, 787 P.2d 933 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (citing T.L.O.) (up-
holding a search for marijuana inside a locked briefcase located in an automobile, which fol-
lowed two other searches including one of the student's pockets, which turned up $230 and a
pager, and one of the student's locker, which turned up nothing incriminating).
123. See In re Dubois, 821 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding a
search of a student's fanny pack for a gun because the student supervisor had "more than rea-
sonable suspicion" to conduct the search).
124. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 561 N.E.2d 832, 835, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citing T.L.O.)
(upholding a search of a student's jacket that turned up two one-dollar bills and three cassette
cases, one of which contained eight marijuana cigarettes. The student was convicted of at-
tempted dealing in marijuana on school property, received a five-year sentence, which was en-
hanced by three additional years because of aggravating factors (two juvenile offenses and one
adult offense)); In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (citing T.L.0.)
(affirming a search of a student's pockets that resulted in the discovery of heroin, the search
being conducted in the presence of an assistant principal and with a security guard directing the
student). But see In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. 80484-1, 733 P.2d 316, 317
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citing T.L.O.) (reversing a delinquency adjudication for possession of
cocaine, noting that "the principal in this case had no personal knowledge regarding the minor's
conduct and had received no specific reports which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
minor's pockets would contain cocaine").
125. See Coffman v. State, 782 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding
a search for a weapon).
126. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). But see T.J. v. State, 538 So. 2d 1320,
1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citing T.L.O.) (reversing a conviction for possession of cocaine by a
fifteen-year-old eighth grader, holding that the search for a weapon in the student's purse did
not justify "examin[ing] the plastic bag in a side pocket which clearly contained no weapon,"
and further stating that "[w]hile school safety may readily justify a basic search for weapons,
the student's interest in privacy should preclude a scavenger hunt after the basic search has pro-
duced no weapons").
127. See, e.g., In re Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing
T.L.O.) (upholding a search that resulted in the discovery of what has been alternatively de-
scribed as a "dirk," "dagger," and "machete knife"); In re Frederick B., 237 Cal. Rptr. 338,
340-41 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing T.L.O.) (A security guard discovered a pistol in the front of
Frederick's waistband while in the process of bodily restraining him. Frederick was then wrestled
to the ground, handcuffed, and taken to the dean's office and searched. In addition to a loaded
firearm, "Frederick was found to be carrying a number of baggies containing a white substance,
$27 in cash, and a half-smoked hand-rolled butt of a cigarette."). But see In re William G., 709
P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985) (citing T.L.O.) (reversing a lower court decision upholding a search of a
student and his calculator case, which contained marijuana, because mere "furtive gestures" do
not generate sufficient suspicion to rise to the required level of reasonableness). Interestingly,
Chief Justice Bird concurred in the judgment in William G., but dissented from the analysis and
argued for the retention of the probable cause standard, as Justice Brennan had argued in
T.L.O. Id. at 1298-99 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See, e.g., Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884 (6th Cir. 1991)
(citing T.L.O.) (rejecting a § 1983 claim, upholding a search and seizure policy that is "facially
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testing 129 are sometimes allowed.
While the facts of many of the above cases are related to issues
addressed in T.L.O., Fraser, and Kuhimeier, the applicable tests
from these Supreme Court cases have been extracted and applied to
cases that involve facts not quite so related. Examples include those
cases that involve student discipline,'30 detention, 3 ' student confes-
sions, 3 1 off-campus field trips,' restrictions on off-campus recrea-
valid," and concluding that the search in this case "was performed in accordance with this con-
stitutionally valid strip search policy"). Note that Justice Stevens in T.L.O. specifically ex-
pressed reservations about the permissibility of strip searches. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 382 n.25
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("One thing is clear under any standard-
the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse.").
129. See Schaill ex re. Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding a student athlete drug testing program on the grounds of rea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment and that procedural challenges built into the program
satisfy due process concerns). But see Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730
F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (citing T.L.O.) (striking down a school policy of drug testing
students engaged in extra-curricular activities without an individualized suspicion requirement);
Odenheim ex rel. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-E. Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 713
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (citing T.L.O.) (holding that the school's drug testing policy
"violates [the student's] rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, violates [their]
rights to due process and violates [their] legitimate expectation of privacy and personal secu-
rity").
Note that the Court in T.L.O. reserved judgment on whether individualized suspicion is re-
quired. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) ("We do not decide whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for
searches by school authorities."). Note further that some commentators have called for an indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement. See Gardner, supra note 69.
130. See, e.g., Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Kuhlmeier)
(upholding the use of corporal punishment and in-school suspension, and finding no substantive
due process violations); Brands v. Sheldon Community Sch., 671 F. Supp. 627, 629 (N.D. Iowa
1987) (citing Fraser) (upholding the suspension of a student wrestler from the wrestling team
because he engaged in conduct that was "detrimental to the best interests of the Sheldon Com-
munity School District," (allegedly engaging in off-campus sexual activity between several male
students and a female student)); Boster v. Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798 (D. Kan. 1986) (citing
Fraser) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the students' due
process rights had not been violated when the students were suspended for three days because of
their admitted vandalism of school property). But see State v. Reyes, 700 P.2d 1155 (Wash.
1985) (en banc) (citing Fraser) (striking down a statute prohibiting insulting or abusing a teacher
because of overbreadth and as being void for vagueness).
131. See, e.g., Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing
T.L.O.) (affirming a summary judgment in favor of the vice principal and the school district in
this § 1983 action, allowing the detention of a student for twenty minutes while investigating
bomb threats); In re Shannon B., 505 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (citing T.L.O.) (up-
holding a detention pursuant to truancy laws).
132. The only case on this point actually excluded the confession. See State v. M.A.L., 765
P.2d 787 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (citing T.L.O.) (upholding the exclusion of a confession of a
fourteen-year-old who was being investigated in connection with school burglaries because of
violations of state law).
133. See Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1154 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing T.L.O.). The
Webb court held that (1) summary judgment should not have been granted in this § 1983 case
STUDENTS' RIGHTS
tion, 3 4 restrictions on the distribution of nonschool materials,'35
restrictions on the use of school facilities, 36 and commingling search
responsibilities between school and police officials. 37 At least one
court has condoned the disclosure to school officials of evidence ob-
with respect to the reasonableness of the principal's search, in T.L.O. terms, of the student's
hotel room because it involves issues of material fact; (2) summary judgment should be affirmed
with respect to the search on the grounds that the search could be deemed reasonable under the
notion of in loco parentis; and (3) whether the principal violated the student's constitutional
rights when he broke through a locked bathroom door, knocking the student against the wall,
then "grab[bing] (the student] from the floor, thr[owing] her against the wall, and slapp[ing]
her" involved disputed facts and should be decided by a trier of fact, thereby precluding sum-
mary judgment on this point. Id. Note how quickly courts are willing to re-invigorate the lesser
standard of in loco parentis, even though the Supreme Court specifically rejected that standard
in T.L.O. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
134. See Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562 (D. Minn. 1990) (citing
Kuhlmeier) (upholding a school restriction prohibiting students from attending parties where
alcohol is served).
135. See, e.g., Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 822
F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Kuhlmeier) (upholding the right of a school to prior review
of student distributed nonschool materials, and finding the rule, as applied, not impermissibly
vague given the desired distribution of an underground newspaper described as "pervasively in-
decent or vulgar"). But see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down as
overly broad a content-based prior restraint rule requiring submission and approval of any mate-
rials distributed at a high school); Slotterback ex rel. Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F.
Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing Kuhlmeier) (striking down in part regulations limiting a stu-
dent's right to distribute nonschool materials on school property); Rivera v. East Otero Sch.
Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) (citing Fraser, Kuhimeier) (striking down an outright
ban on distribution of materials advocating a particular religious or political view, but denying a
motion for summary judgment because material facts remained undetermined as to whether the
distribution of the materials involved in this ease was disruptive).
136. See, e.g., Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (up-
holding a school's policy of not allowing student groups to use school facilities for religious
purposes), order amended, 701 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1988), appeal dismissed, 880 F.2d 411
(5th Cir. 1989) (citing Fraser). But see, e.g., Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v.
Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (citing Kuhimeier) (upholding the rights of stu-
dents to use school facilities for a Christian club).
137. See, e.g., Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 930
(1987) (citing T.L.O.) (affirming a directed verdict for defendants in this § 1983 case, holding
that the search of the student was reasonable even though a police liaison official was present
during the search. The court held that since the search was initiated by school officials, this was
sufficient to meet the reasonableness standard); Martens ex rel. Martens v. District No. 220 Bd.
of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing T.L.O.) (granting the defendant's summary
judgment motion in a suit based on a search of a student who was told by a sheriff's deputy
"that based on his experience it would be better to cooperate with school officials," whereupon
the student complied with a request to empty his pockets and a pipe with marijuana residue was
found). But see In re F.P., 528 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (citing T.L.O.) (reversing a
lower court decision allowing a "school official exception" to the probable cause standard for
searches and seizures when the school official acted at the request of the police).
Note that the Court in T.L.O. reserved judgment on the issue raised in Martens. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7 (1985) ("This case does not present the question of the
appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in con-
junction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies . . . .").
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tained by undercover police engaged in sting activities in public
schools. "I
Whether it be student press or expression, a search issue, or some
other student right, some of these cases would probably turn out the
same regardless of the standard applied.3 9 However, it is questionable
whether it should be sufficient to cite "legitimate pedagogical rea-
sons" for prohibiting a student from participating in a student bal-
lot.'4 ° Under the Kuhlmeier test, and in light of the Court's deference
to school administration, it is sufficient.' 41 Nevertheless, at a mini-
mum, a court should explore the student interest at stake and how a
reasonable student would act before condoning such actions.
While many of these cases are disturbing, most of them contain
some reasoning underlying their decisions, even if the reasoning is ul-
timately unsatisfactory. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal,
however, represents an extreme example. It liked T.L.O. so much that
between August 20, 1985, and January 7, 1986, it issued three per cur-
Jam decisions affirming lower courts that relied upon, inter alia,
T.L.O., without further explanation. 42 This is perhaps the greatest
danger of allowing "flexibility": it precludes student reliance on any
absolute level of constitutionally protected rights and allows courts to
not even bother with balancing competing interests.
School administrators are continuously challenged to find ways to
instill more socially-acceptable values in our youth. This recitation of
cases proves the point. Arguably, if school administrators were doing
anything less, they would not be doing their jobs. Nevertheless, many
of these lower court cases are inconsistent with the notion that the
Constitution is a baseline that preserves and protects students' rights.
These decisions also undermine the authority of Barnette, Tinker, and
Pico, which should be taken seriously because: (1) the value of re-
specting students' constitutional rights first articulated in Barnette
continues to be articulated by the Court through Kuhimeier; and
(2) the Court has failed to provide an adequate justification for shift-
ing from what was previously a very respectful view of students' con-
138. See Legaux v. Zimmerman, Civ. A. No. 86-0354, 1987 WL 20114 (E.D. La. 1987) (cit-
ing T.L.O.) (dismissing a student's § 1983 suit against sheriff's officials for invasion of privacy
resulting from an undercover officer's observing the student smoking marijuana, his subsequent
arrest for possession and distribution of marijuana, and the disclosure of this information by the
sheriff's department to school officials, leading to the expulsion of the student).
139. See, e.g., Coffman v. State, 782 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
140. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
142. See T.G. v. State, 481 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (per curiam); W.A. v. State, 478
So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (per curiam); D.C. v. State, 474 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
(per curiam).
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stitutional rights toward a view that is deferential to the authority of
school administrators.
IV. STUDENTS CRY OUT: THE MEDIA AND THE ARTS AS PROXIES FOR
THE REAL "REAL WORLD"
The rhetoric courts use concerning students does not match the real-
ity of what students are facing and dealing with on a daily basis. The
best proof of this would be to talk to students directly and find out if
their feelings match the courts' assertions. Unfortunately, while stu-
dents are occasionally heard from, 4 broad access to students is lim-
ited, 44 and alternative outlets for student opinion often face
resistance. 45 Not allowing students to speak for themselves results in
inaccurate characterizations by others, especially the courts, of what
students are saying, thinking, and doing.'4
143. See, e.g., Felicia R. Lee, Running Schools and Homework Assignments, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1992, at B3 (profiling a student representative on the New York City Board of Educa-
tion); Karen S. Peterson, USA Today's Teen Panel, USA TODAY, July 24, 1992, at 8D (profiling
fifteen teenagers and seeking their comments on a variety of issues facing teenagers today).
144. One example of limited access is the policy of the Texas Association of Student Coun-
cils not to release the names of student council presidents in order to protect them. While this
might be a concern, it illustrates the difficulty, even for those pursuing academic interests, in
gaining access to student opinion. See Letter from Eddie G. Bull, Assistant Executive Director,
Texas Association of Student Councils, to Stuart L. Leviton (July 6, 1993) (on file with the
Florida State University Law Review).
145. See Zeke MacCormack, 7 Students Punished for Newsletter, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
May 22, 1993, at BI (discussing the suspension of students for distributing an unauthorized
newsletter on school property and quoting a student who stated that when he argued before the
principal that he was exercising his constitutional rights, the principal responded that "we [stu-
dents] forfeit all rights when we enter the school"); Barbara Kate Repa, Reports of the First
Amendment Hiwe Been Greatly Exaggerated, STUDENT LAWYER, Dec. 1992, at 36 (discussing the
suspension of two students for reciting the following Mark Twain quotation, reprinted in A
Teachers' Treasury of Quotations, over the school public address system as the "Inspirational
Thought For the Day": "In the first place, God created idiots. This was for practice. Then he
made school boards."); James S. Hirsch, Underground High School Papers Thrive as Teen-
Agers Rebel Against Censorship, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1992, at BI (discussing the frustration of
students in both getting information and communicating with one another, and citing instances
when students have started underground newspapers and have been suspended from school for
critical comments regarding schools and school officials); supra notes 114-15 (reviewing cases
that restrict student publications); supra note 135 (reviewing cases discussing distributional res-
trictions on nonschool materials). But see, Tim Lott, School Columnist Cuts Trustees Down to
Size, AUsTIN Am.-STATESMAN, May 11, 1993, at BI (profiling an outspoken high school newspa-
per columnist who, although critical of school board officials, is allowed to voice his opinion);
Kimberly Garcia, Bridging the Gap, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 1, 1993, at BI (discussing a
symposium attended by students and city leaders, and quoting one city council member as say-
ing, "I never dreamed in my wildest dreams that there'd be this much [student] involvement");
Rosalinda Guerrero, Students Require Information, Support From Schools, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, April 27, 1993, at A9 (taking the opportunity as a guest columnist to express the
concerns and views of a high school senior).
146. See Roe, supra note 59, at 1344 n.364 ("[Situdents have considerably greater capacity
for meaningful thought than historically or presently ascribed to them by the Court, so that the
value accorded to student speech rights should be increased.").
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A more accurate or realistic view of students can be obtained by
reviewing various media accounts discussing issues facing teenagers
today. The arts can also be used as a proxy for student opinion, al-
though, concededly, this may be stretching it a bit.141 Even though the
arts are often created by adults and may simply be creations of the
imagination, the consumers of this art are often students, which must
indicate that they relate to it on some level. 148
Even if one is doubtful as to the utility of reviewing reality through
the eyes of the media and the arts, one should not forget the purpose
of this exercise. The purpose is not to articulate with precision exactly
what students believe, but rather to demonstrate that notions of a rea-
sonable educator and a reasonable student, while not mutually exclu-
sive, are not the same. A review of what students are watching,
reading, and listening to gives further insight into what students are
thinking and feeling.
One reporter has commented, "Crank up adolescent frustration to
the breaking point, and it can come back three ways: as cynicism, as
morbid fantasy and as spite laced with insecurity.' '1 49 Unfortunately,
while this assessment might be correct for some youth, for many oth-
ers there are less abstract, more serious, and potentially more danger-
ous issues. The following is a discussion of four major issues facing
students and youth today: (1) sex; (2) drugs; (3) violence; and (4) a
general notion of despair.150
147. It might only be stretching it for adults. USA Today ran a story under a glossy picture
captioned "What's Pop Culture Teaching Our Kids?" USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1992, at DI. Par-
ents are concerned about what they perceive as the "negative images" of "racist hate in rap
music, sexist violence in videos, [and] sexual irresponsibility on TV." Anita Minning, Parents
Fear Reign of Sex and Violence, USA TODAY, March 16, 1992, at BI -B2. However, students
perceive television much differently. One student, summarizing the role of television, states,
Kids like TV that shows realistic situations .... They portray what's going on and
they're just gutsy enough to do it, and that's what shocks parents . . . . But that's
what goes on in life, that's what goes on in peoples' houses. Students like that, they
like seeing what goes on between guys and girls.
Id.
148. People magazine ran a cover story on the past fifty years of teen idols. Whole Lot of
Faintin' Goin' On, PEOPLE, July 27, 1992, at 43. The article explained the relevance and impor-
tance of teen idols:
Like video games and the atomic bomb, teen idols are one of the defining inventions
of our time....
What do teenagers want in a teen idol? A glimpse of heaven without adult supervi-
sion. They may not be philosophers, but adolescents still have a philosopher's yearn-
ing for the ideal. ...
These idols help us find our way too. They take our earliest notions of passion, love,
devotion, and cast them on a wide screen. ...
Id.
149. Jon Pareles, A Battle of 2 Headliner Bands, N.Y. TimEs, July 20, 1992, at Cl.
150. See Laura Sessions Stepp, Youthful Optimism Has Turned to Pessimism, AusTiN AM.-
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A. Reality Check Number 1: Sex
School administrators have a preoccupation with the topic of sex.",
As such, this fixation deserves special attention. The reality is that
whether society likes it or not, students are sexually aware,'52 and
many are sexually active.'53 A recent survey by the federal Centers for
Disease Control 54 reports that in the aggregate, fifty-four percent of
high school students have engaged in sexual activity.'55 There also is
evidence that more and more students become sexually active each
day. 156
Paralleling the rise in youth sexual activity is the concern and fear
of sexually-related health problems. These considerations include teen
pregnancy,1 7 sexually transmitted diseases (STDs),15 8 and AIDS. 59 In
STATESMAN, Feb. 12, 1993, at Cl ("If there is one group of people in need of . . . hope, it's
today's adolescents. Recent surveys reveal that a majority of Americans ages 12 to 17, about 20
million youths, are increasingly pessimistic about this country's future and, to a lesser extent,
their own."). Cf. Hirsch, supra note 145 (discussing the growth of alternative outlets for student
opinion, and quoting one student's description of the shortcomings of her high school's newspa-
per: "There's no drugs, there's no sex, kids don't get pregnant, and everyone gets good
grades.").
151. Note that notions of sex, sexuality, and sexual autonomy were relevant in Fraser and
Kuhlmeier. See supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.
152. Seventeen magazine has done several articles to assist its mostly adolescent female read-
ership in better understanding sex, sexuality and the implications of sexual activity. See, e.g.,
Debra Kent, Sex & Your Body: The No of the '90s-Sexual Decision-Making in a New Age,
SEVENTEEN, Jan. 1991, at 32-35 (interviewing teenage girls who are abstaining from sexual activ-
ity, and discussing the major health risks of pregnancy, AIDS, STDs and future infertility);
Debra Kent, Sex & Your Body: Talking to Your Parents about Sex, SEVENTEEN, Apr. 1990, at
100-05 [hereinafter Kent, Talking to Your Parents] (giving advice to young women on how to
talk to their parents about sex); Kathy McCoy, Quiz: Are You Ready to Have Sex?, SEVENTEEN,
Jan. 1989, at 12 (attempting to present questions young women should ask in determining
whether they are ready to have sex).
153. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
154. See 54% in High School Say They've Had Sex, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Jan. 4, 1992,
at IA [hereinafter 54% in High School]. Note that while this report attempts to present objective
information on the sexual activity of youth, other attempts have been blocked by special inter-
ests. See, e.g., id. at 9A ("In July, federal Department of Health and Human Services officials
postponed plans for a larger and more detailed survey of teen sex habits. That study came under
fire from conservatives who called it wasteful and intrusive, citing questions about homosexual
behavior, among others.").
155. See 54% in High School, supra note 154. Breaking down the aggregate figure, the re-
port says that 40% of ninth-graders reported having had sex, 48% of tenth-graders, 5701o of
eleventh-graders, and by the twelfth grade, fully 72% reported already having had sex. Id.
156. See Manning, supra note 147, at BI (noting that "[elvery day, 8,441 teens become sexu-
ally active"). But see Karen S. Peterson, Virginity May be Gaining a New Cachet, USA TODAY,
July 24, 1992, at D1-D2 (noting that there are early signs of a renewed teen interest in either
remaining virgins, returning to abstinence if previously sexually active, or delaying sexual activ-
ity).
157. See Peterson, supra note 156, at D2 (noting that youth fear pregnancy the most when
contemplating sexual activity).
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fact, AIDS affecting youth has become such a major concern that
Newsweek ran a cover story on the issue. 10
Condom manufacturers, recognizing the rise in teenage sexuality,
have actually started specifically targeting the teenage market. 6'
While not everyone is enthusiastic about an advertising campaign
aimed at youths fourteen and older, 62 this campaign does seem to be
a market-driven response to the realities of the day.
Marketers are not the only ones to recognize that students are inter-
ested in sex. The arts also address this issue as one of many that affect
teenagers. One television program that has become popular with the
young is Beverly Hills, 90210.163 The show, which focuses on teenagers
in Beverly Hills, "has become more than a hit series; it is a social
phenomenon of worldwide proportions."'6 The show has "man-
age[d] to tap into real concerns of contemporary teens: dating, par-
ents, friends, sex."' 65 Dylan McKay, a central character in the show,
"has become a touchstone for the American public: he's Everyteen, a
youngster who, growing up quite cognizant of the frightening age in
which he lives-AIDS, drugs, family, and now urban violence-re-
tains not only a cool resolve but also a cooler integrity."' 66
Many students, frustrated with a lack of free and open outlets to
explore issues relevant to their lives, are turning to shows like Beverly
158. See, 54% in High School, supra note 154, at 9A (noting that one out of every twenty-
five responding students said that they had contracted an STD); see also Kent, Talking to Your
Parents, supra note 152.
159. See Peterson, supra note 156, at D2. One student commented, "You can be rid of a
pregnancy. You can't get rid of AIDS. .. .That is what is keeping most of us away from sex."
Id.
160. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Teenagers and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1992, at 45-
49.
161. See Company Targets Teens with New Brand of Condom, AusTiN AM.-STATESMAN,
Nov. 28, 1991, at ElO [hereinafter Condom] (discussing a condom manufacturer's repackaging
of its condoms using a "marketing mix aimed at teens-a $3 price, a compact six-condom pack-
age with neon graphics, free condom key chains or rub-off tattoo kits inside and advertising on
MTV").
162. Id. (noting that some feel the "Safe Play Condoms for Young Lovers" will encourage
teens to have sex). A better educated youth, however, should at least have a greater chance of
preventing some of the serious health repercussions unprotected sex can lead to, should he or she
choose to take precautions. At least one study has found that education can work. See, 54% in
High School, supra note 154 (discussing a survey by Girls Inc. which found that teen pregnancy
fell 50 percent once teens were educated).
163. See Zip Code Heaven, PEOPLE, July 27, 1992, at 102 (noting that Beverly Hills, 90210
"is watched by more teens than any other series on TV").
164. Kevin Sessums, Wild About Perry, VArry FAR, July 1992, at 96. See id. at 151 (dis-
cussing the popularity of the show in the United States and noting that new episodes shown
during the summer of 1991 attracted 69 percent of the female teenage audience).
165. Richard Zoglin, Revenge of the Androids, TnME, July 20, 1992, at 78.
166. Sessums, supra note 164, at 96.
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Hills, 90210 as an alternative means of exploring matters such as
sex., 67 This show is important because it provides insight into the sub-
jects our students are interested in. The arts also demonstrate that,
despite the Court's rhetoric, '8 students are not so naive, or so inno-
cent, that they are unable to handle issues, such as sex, that they face
daily. Luke Perry, who plays Dylan McKay, has stated, "I try to reit-
erate to these people writing the show that these kids ain't stupid.
They see. They know. 'Don't be afraid to talk to them about real
issues on a real level, because they are fucking way ahead of you.""' 169
While this might not be the most eloquent articulation of an approach
to relating to youth, it is brutally honest.
This discussion of sex could not be complete without mentioning
Madonna. In a retrospective on teen idols, People magazine described
Madonna as follows: "For millions of teenagers, Madonna was the
girl of their disobedient dreams. She had power; they had none. She
was free, while they still needed Mom's permission to stay out past
10."170 Her media coverage ranges from the expected-Rolling
Stone 7 '-to such unexpected sources as the Economist, 72 National
Review, 17 and The Progressive.'74 Without passing judgment on the
merits of these articles, it cannot be denied that Madonna nonetheless
demands attention from most quarters of society. She is indeed an
icon,' 75 and understanding her may aid in the understanding of high
school students today.
167. Id. at 152. A network executive, discussing the show, stated,
I think that the kids in some cases look to it to begin a dialogue with their parents
about things. If you look at the demographics of who is watching, it's not just teens.
It's teens going all the way up into the mid-to late forties. So that says to me that it's
teens probably with their parents. It probably becomes one of the few times during the
week where they stimulate a discussion. We know that from the mail we get-this
program is something that the family shares together.
Id.
168. See, e.g., supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the rhetoric of Fraser).
169. Sessums, supra note 164, at 149.
170. Madonna, PEOPLE, July 27, 1992, at 46.
171. See Carrie Fisher, True Confessions: The Rolling Stone Interview With Madonna,
ROLLING STONE, June 13, 1991, at 35 (part I of a 2-part interview) (hereinafter Fisher, Part 1);
Carrie Fisher, True Confessions: The Rolling Stone Interview With Madonna, ROLLING STONE,
June 27, 1991, at 45 (part 2 of a 2-part interview) (hereinafter Fisher, Part 11).
172. See Madonna: Dominatrix of Discourse, EcorNosIST, July 27, 1991, at 82 (describing
Madonna as a "musical opportunist").
173. See Joseph Sobran, Single Sex and the Girl, NAT'L REV., Aug. 12, 1991, at 32 (profiling
Madonna, disapproving of Madonna's use of sexual themes, and concluding that Madonna
mocks "Christian values").
174. See Ruth Conniff, Politics in a Post-Feminist Age, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1991, at 17
(contrasting Madonna as post-feminist woman with "real women" who must still struggle with
low wages and a lack of control over their own destinies).
175. The label "icon" has been used to describe Madonna more than once. See Fisher, Part
1, supra note 171, at 35; Madonna: Dominatrix of Discourse, supra note 172, at 82.
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While Madonna has certainly produced her fair share of fluff, 7 6
some of her songs seem to go right to the heart of what the teenagers
of today are feeling and thinking. An example is "Papa Don't
Preach.'1 77 The song has been described as an anti-abortion an-
them. 7 More importantly, it is a plea by a young girl for understand-
ing. The lyrics are:
Papa I know you're going to be upset
'Cause I was always your little girl
But you should know by now
I'm not a baby
You always taught me right from wrong
I need your help, daddy please be strong
I may be young at heart
But I know what I'm saying
The one you warned me all about
The one you said I could do without
We're in an awful mess
And I don't mean maybe-please
Papa don't preach, I'm in trouble deep
Papa don't preach, I've been losing sleep
But I made up my mind, I'm keeping my baby
I'm gonna keep my baby, mmm...
He says that he's going to marry me
We can raise a little family
Maybe we'll be all right
It's a sacrifice
But my friends keep telling me to give it up
Saying I'm too young, I ought to live it up
What I need right now is some good advice, please .... 179
The notion of Madonna as social commentator may offend some
people. However, given the amount of publicity surrounding Ma-
donna, it seems appropriate to look at her music, not just her hype.
Seemingly, at least some of her popularity can be attributed to her
music. Confronted with "Papa Don't Preach," one may either em-
ploy a Kuhlmeier-type naivete and conclude that discussions of preg-
nancy are inappropriate in the high school setting, or one may
recognize that high school students are indeed sexually active. 80
176. See, e.g., MADONNA, Material Girl, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Sire Records 1984); MADONNA,
Lucky Star, on MADONNA (Sire Records (1983); MADONNA, Where's the Party, on TRUE BLUE
(Sire Records 1986).
177. MADONNA, Papa Don't Preach, on TRUE BLUE (Sire Records 1986).
178. See Madonna: Dominatrix of Discourse, supra note 172.
179. MADONNA, Papa Don't Preach, on TRUE BLUE (Sire Records 1986).
180. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
STUDENTS' RIGHTS
The point of this reality check is not so much to pass judgment on
teenage sexuality; rather, it is to provide evidence that when the Court
discusses the innocence and naivete of youth, or the inability of our
youth to address issues of sexuality, these assertions are not supported
by facts. It is perhaps the Court which is unable to understand, and
the schools which are not adequately able to address, this pressing so-
cial issue.
B. Reality Check Number 2: All the Rest
On a broader level, many of our youth are in a precarious situa-
tion.'8' One study found that over the past thirty years, the number of
teenage suicides and homicides has increased almost three-fold on a
per capita basis.' 2 The study further reports that the number of
unwed mothers has doubled between 1960 and 1988,183 and that, cur-
rently, one in four children are living in poverty.'4
Drugs also afflict our students. Recent surveys present conflicting
findings with respect to the trend in high school student drug use.' 85
Even under the rosier scenario, at least twenty-nine percent of high
school seniors report using drugs.'8 6 One article cited drugs, along
with sex and AIDS, as the "triple threat" facing teenagers today, and
noted the correlation between the use of alcohol or other drugs and
teenage pregnancies. 87
The schools, which should be a refuge to which students can turn,
are failing to address these concerns. During the 1980s, people ques-
tioned the efficacy of our public schools. 8 One commentator notes
181. See generally, Experts Say Status of Kids Worsened in Last 30 Years, DAL.s MosINo
NEws, Jan. 3, 1992, at 1A [hereinafter Kids Status] ("In a disturbing measure of the effect of
economic and social change, a new study says that the status of children in the United States has
declined by almost every measure during the past 30 years.").
182. See id. at 13A (The study found that the suicide rate for youths between the ages of
fifteen and nineteen increased from 3.5 per 100,000 youths in 1960 to 11.3 per 100,000 youths in
1988, and that homicide figures for the same group over the same time frame rose from 4.0 per
100,000 to 11.7 per 100,000.).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See High School Drug Use Declines, OR.ANDo SENTINEL TamuNE, Jan. 28, 1992, at A4
(finding that drug use among high school seniors was down from 33% in 1990 to 29% in 1991).
But see Doug Isenberg, Teen Drug Use Up, Reversing Trend, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 20, 1992, at
El (discussing a more recent survey that indicates a reversal in a three-year trend of declining
drug use among teenagers).
186. See High School Drug Use Declines, supra note 185, at A4.
187. See Bob Dart, Drugs, Sex, AIDS: Symposium Warns Teens of "Triple Threat, " AusTIN
Am.-STATESMAN, Dec. 6, 1992, at A20.
188. See, e.g., MARK G. YUIDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND TtE LAW 816 (3d ed.
1992) (noting that Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform was the first in a
series of reports addressing the "crisis in American education").
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that "[t]he major reform effort ... has focused not on enhancing
quality but on reversing what the National Commission on Excellence
in Education termed 'a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our
future as a nation and a people."'" t 9 Unfortunately, while much dis-
cussion on this issue continues today, it is unclear whether any true
advances have been made.190
The schools are not only educationally unsound, their campuses are
violent as well. Gone are the days when teenagers were involved in
"innocent" fun, such as gum chewing.' 9' Today, students either have,
or have access to, weapons. 92 Moreover, today's students are not
afraid to use them. Students are committing homicides, 93 conspiring
to commit homicides,'9 and facilitating drug deals. 195 Under these
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., William Tucker, School Choice and Reforms for the Future, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 4, 1991, at A14 ("After increasing education spending by 33% over the past decade, Amer-
icans realize they have very little to show for it."); Review & Outlook: Education Dinosaurs,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992, at A20 (noting that the past "decade of 'reform' has produced only
lower SAT scores ...."),
191. See, e.g., Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988).
Today's public schools face severe challenges in maintaining the order and discipline
necessary for the impartation of knowledge. A recent study conducted by the Fuller-
ton, California, Police Department and the California Department of Education, for
instance, shows that, while schoolteachers in the 1940's listed talking, chewing gum,
and running in the hallways as the primary disciplinary problems they encountered,
today's schoolteachers are more concerned with drug abuse, rape, robbery, assault,
burglary, arson, and bombings.
Id. at 924-25 (citing Ezra Bowen, Getting Tough, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 54).
192. See Rod Nordland, Deadly Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 22 (quoting a fifteen-
year-old New York City student who stated, "If you had the money, you could get yourself a
'tool' [gun] in 15 minutes. I would say, out of 100 kids, 90 got guns or can get them."); Tom
Morganthau et al., It's Not Just New York, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 25 ("According to the
federal Centers for Disease Control, one student in five reports carrying a weapon of some type
and about one student in 20, or 5.3 percent, reports carrying a gun.").
193. See, e.g., Accidental Shooting Kills 1, Wounds I at L.A. High School, AusTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Jan. 22, 1993, at A4; Zeke MacCormack, I Dead, I Wounded in Shooting Blamed
on 2 Killeen [Texas] Teen-agers, AUSTIN Am.-SrATEsSm , Jan. 23, 1992, at B2 (discussing an
after-school shooting that was thought to have been prompted by a fight at school between two
female students); Robert D. McFadden, Student Shot to Death in a High School in Brooklyn,
N.Y. Ttmis, Nov. 26, 1991, at A12.
As two teenage boys fought with fists, a third youth drew a gun and opened fire in the
crowded hallway of a Brooklyn high school today, and the wild shots killed a 16-year-
old bystander and critically wounded a teacher who was approaching to intervene.
One law-enforcement official said the fistfight that preceded the shootings . . . appar-
ently stemmed from a dispute over a book bag. Another investigator said the youth
began firing when he saw that his friend was losing the fight.
Id.
194. See Teens Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Kill Fellow Student in California, AusTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Nov. 26, 1991, at A4 (describing how two thirteen-year-olds and a fourteen-year-old
pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to kill a fifteen-year-old described as a "bully").
195. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 561 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (student convicted of
selling marijuana at school); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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conditions, school administrators could make, and judging by lower
court decisions have made, cases for a wide variety of actions, each
justified as "reasonable."
For lack of a better place to turn, many teenagers look to each
other for support. Numerous media accounts depict this phenomenon.
One newspaper article chronicled the life of some Hollywood, Califor-
nia, teenagers dubbed the "Trolls" and their harsh lifestyle.," An-
other story analyzed the rise of gang activity, not by young men, but
by young women in search of protection. 197 Courts do not seem to
address these situations in their rhetoric. Courts and, more impor-
tantly, school administrators do not listen to these cries for help.
Students not only attempt to express their dissatisfaction with the
system through their own actions and words, but they also express
themselves vicariously through the arts that they consume. Tracy
Chapman 98 sings of radical change,' 99 escapism," and asks the most
difficult, lingering question, "Why?" '20' Pink Floyd's The Wall, 202 still
popular with today's youth,203 presents another artistic expression of
youthful disillusion. Both the classic refrain from Another Brick in
196. Sonia L. Nazario, Playing House: Troubled Teen-agers Create a Fragile Family Beneath
a Busy Street, WAL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992, at Al. The opening paragraph of the article presents a
stark look at the existence of some youths.
Five teen-agers crouch over a candle in a dark, fetid cavern under a busy roadway.
Around them, the dirt floor seems to move as rats look for food. As the teen-agers
pass around a half-gallon bottle of Riesling, they talk about their latest sexual scores.
This is the place the teens call, simply, the Hole. "This is my home," reads a graffito
scrawled on a concrete wall.
Id.
197. See Felicia R. Lee, Violence, Loneliness Drive More Girls into Gangs, Experts Say,
AUSTiN Am.-STATESMAN, Nov. 28, 1991, at E14 (noting that the motivation to join gangs appar-
ently stems from a need to gain protection from the violence around them).
198. Tracy Chapman was introduced at a Farm Aid benefit concert "as the most important
'poet and dreamer of her day."' Karen Schoemer, Tracy Chapman Struggles to Live up to Ex-
pectations, AussN AM.-STATESMAN, May 4, 1992, at B9.
199. See TRACY CHAPMAN, Talkin' Bout a Revolution, on TRACY CHAPMAN (SBK Records
1988) ("finally the tables are starting to turn"). The album, Tracy Chapman, has been described
as one that "spoke volumes in whispers and minute details." Schoemer, supra note 198.
200. See TRAcy CHAPMtA, Fast Car, on TRACY CHLA M'AN (SBK Records 1988) ("You got a
fast car/l want a ticket to anywhere/Maybe we make a deal/Maybe together we can get some-
where/Anyplace is better/Starting from zero got nothing to lose/Maybe we'll make something/
But me myself I got nothing to prove").
201. See TRACY CHAPMAN, Why?, on TRAcY CHAPMAN (SBK Records 1988).
202. PINK FLOYD, TH-E WALL (Columbia Records 1979).
203. The Wall was number 18 on the Billboard "Top Pop Catalog Albums" chart during the
week of August 29, 1992. Top Pop Catalog Albums, BILLBOARD, Aug. 29, 1992, at 49. This
chart contains "albums [of] older titles which have previously appeared on the Billboard 200
Top Albums chart and are registering significant sales." Id.
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the Wall, Part 2,2°4 "We don't need no education," 205 and the sense of
betrayal in Mother,2 °6 illustrate the disbelief and distrust youth have
toward institutions designed to inculcate correct values in them. 207
The popularity of movies such as Dead Poet's Society ,20 an extreme
example of youthful despair in which the youthful protagonist, in
classic Shakespearean tragedy form, commits suicide to escape the sti-
fling control of his father, and Footloose,2°9 a movie and accompany-
ing soundtrack which depicts teenagers overcoming frustration
through a communal grant of empowerment, are further examples of
the arts reflecting the desires and needs of the young.
Sex, drugs, violence, and despair are very serious issues facing our
students today. The Supreme Court and lower courts do not ade-
quately or accurately incorporate these issues in their discussions of
students. The rhetoric used by courts simply does not match the real-
ity facing students, which implies that the current reasonableness test
for students' constitutional rights is unjustified and should be re-
placed with a protected sphere of students' rights based on the princi-
ples of Barnette, Tinker, and Pico.210
Some might argue that the issues raised in this Article justify more
stringent control of students, not less; however, there is independent
support for promoting students' rights as an educational matter. Pro-
204. PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall, Part 2, on THE WALL (Columbia Records
1979).
205. Id.
206. PINK FLOYD, Mother, on Tim WALL (Columbia Records 1979) ("Hush now baby don't
you cry/Mama's gonna make all of your/Nightmares come true/Mama's gonna put all of her
fears into you/Mama's gonna keep you right here/Under her wing/She won't let you fly but she
might let you sing/Mama will keep baby cozy and warm/ ... /Of course Mam'll help build the
wall").
207. There is at least one case in which a teacher was discharged for showing the movie
version of this album. See Fowler v. Board of Educ. of Lincoln County, 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.
1987).
208. DEAD POET'S SOCIETY (Touchstone Pictures 1989). See Mary McHugh, Hits and Misses
of Seasons Past, N.Y. TsMiS, Sept. 6, 1992, § 2, at 15 (DEAD POET'S SOCIETY grossed $94 mil-
lion). The movie has been described as a "critically acclaimed film .. which inspires teachers to
teach and students to learn .... The film was applauded by the British House of Commons for
'celebrating the wonder of poetry, literature and language [, and] ... the importance of courage
and integrity, non-conformism and free thought."' Sixth Annual Kohl Award to Honor Teach-
ers, PR NEwswIsE, Mar. 29, 1990, available in, LExIs, Nexis Library, Omni File. One library
also has set up screenings of the movie for teenagers. See Children in Spotlight at Auburn Kids-
day, SEATTLE TiEs, June 25, 1992, at F3.
209. FOOTLOOSE (Paramount Pictures 1984). At the time of its release, Footloose was de-
scribed as "hugely popular." Vincent Canby, Film View: Musicals Move Ahead While Looking
Back, NY. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1984, § 2. at 19.
210. See supra section II.A.
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moting students' rights may: (1) further "conceptual development"; 21
(2) foster debate on diverse issues; 212 (3) increase the chances that stu-
dents will "experience the positive power of the law"; 213 and (4) fur-
ther respect for human dignity.214 These examples lend support to the
premise that students should have rights because of their value to the
educational process.
Beyond the educational justification is an equally plausible interpre-
tation of reality that lends support to legal recognition of students'
constitutional rights. Because of the seriousness of this issue, and due
to the temptation to discount students' rights, or to balance away stu-
dents' rights under the guise of reasonableness, the Court must return
to the principles of Barnette, Tinker, and Pico or the discussions of
students' rights will be rendered meaningless. Instead-of reducing con-
stitutional protection as the seriousness of the issue increases, the op-
posite must be done. The serious issues present the greatest need for
constitutional protections.
A final observation on reality and a comment on the benefits of
respecting students' rights relate to combining the educational mission
with the law. The Tinker Court discussed the importance of respect. 215
Students cannot realistically be expected to respect anyone-them-
selves, other students, school administrators, or adults in general-if
school administrators do not demonstrate the importance of the con-
cept by respecting the students. The law and its positive effects will
not be recognized or respected if school administrators continuously
resort to "the law" to justify suppression of student activities. If a
student's dignity is not respected, it should come as no surprise if the
student refuses to respect the dignity of others. To ensure the success
of the educational mission, the law must support students by provid-
ing the necessary counterbalancing force needed to foster a more bal-
anced relationship between students and school administrators, so
that respect can be realistically promoted between both groups. 216
211. Roe, supra note 59, at 1276 (" [A]n understanding of the work of the schools as concep-
tual development necessitates a high degree of tolerance for student speech under the protection
of the [Flirst [Almendment.").
212. See Lee Gordon, Note, Achieving a Student-Teacher Dialectic in Public Secondary
Schools: State Legislatures Must Promote Value-Positive Education, 36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.
397, 400 (1991).
213. Geimer, supra note 38, at 973.
214. See Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the
Constitution Requires, 39 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1293 (1988).
215. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
216. See Dienes and Connolly, supra note 110, at 394 ("Students, teachers, and parents have
substantive constitutional rights that the courts are obligated to protect.... While judges may
properly give deference to administrative decisions when deference to administrative expertise is
called for [this] must not be exalted to the point that substantive judicial review becomes a
meaningless ritual.").
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V. A PROPOSED BALANCED RELATIONSHIP
To achieve a balanced relationship, school administrators must be-
gin respecting students and include students in the decisions that af-
fect the students' lives. This newfound sensitivity might seem
simplistic and perhaps even naive. It is, in fact, based in part on an
ideal world. In an ideal world there would be a sphere of protected
rights that are not subject to balancing, reasonableness, or any other
test. Even in such a world, however, the game would likely change
from a balancing act to a debate on how large the sphere of rights
should be.
The principle that should be strived for in a balanced relationship
was roughly articulated in Arnold v. Carpenter,27 which dealt with a
student dress code. The majority, in upholding a male student's right
to wear long hair, stated,
It is understandable why some judges find students' "long hair"
claims constitutionally insubstantial. Measured against today's great
constitutional issues (capital punishment, abortion, school
segregation) the question of whether a student may or may not have
constitutional protection in selection of his hair dress appears de
minimis. Perhaps even judges who sustain the right are nagged with
impatience and doubt when faced with student claims. But we look
down across a gap of a generation or two, from the Olympian
heights of what we consider the great issues. For the high school
student claimant, however, the right to wear "long hair" is an issue
vital to him and we have seen what he is willing to sacrifice for his
claim. It is settled that the students have constitutional rights of
freedom and there appears to be no reason why the values 'of
freedom are less precious in a younger generation than in an older!"
It is easy to see that school administrators may believe each is reason-
able in desiring a dress code, 2 9 and that students might disagree with
school administrators on how the dress code should be written. Ar-
217. 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
218. Id. at 941-42 n.5. Justice Stevens, then a Seventh Circuit judge, dissented in this case. It
is interesting that he makes a similar plea for acceptance and respect for student views in Fraser.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 692 n.2 (1986). This controversy over student
hair length, and the sacrifices students are willing to make, was recently revisited. See Toungate
ex rel Toungate v. Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist., 842 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a
third-grade student's fight to wear a "thin ponytail five or six inches below his collar," and
discussing the student's subsequent in-school suspension. Id. at 826).
219. One principal attempted to implement a dress code banning certain colors and logos in
response to gangs. See Baytown School's Dress Code Forbids 'Gang' Colors, AusTIN Am.-
STATrSmA, Mar. 29, 1992, at BI0.
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nold is particularly interesting because students were actually involved
in the formulation of the dress code that Carpenter challenged. 2 0 In
siding with Carpenter, the Court preserved a sphere of protected
rights, even though the students and school administrators that wrote
the policy were acting reasonably in requiring alternate behavior.
Because it is unlikely that a claimant will find a court this sympa-
thetic today, 2 1 a more explicit solution to balancing student and
school interests is necessary. A possible solution includes a three-step
analysis that will both respect the constitutional rights of students and
allow school administrators to carry out their educational mission.
The three steps are: (1) determine the reasonableness of the school
administrator's actions in light of a reasonable educator standard;
(2) if necessary, determine the reasonableness of the student's conduct
in light of a reasonable student standard; and (3) if necessary, balance
the interests of the school administrator with the interests of the stu-
dent to determine whether the student ought to be allowed to act, or
whether the school administrator ought to be allowed to restrict the
student's actions.
Step one requires the fact finder to determine whether the school
administrator's actions, in some absolute sense, are reasonable in light
of a reasonable educator standard.22 2 The question that must be asked
is: Would a reasonable educator act in the manner in which the actual
school administrator acted in light of all of the circumstances? If the
answer is no, the inquiry ends. If the school administrator's actions
are found to be unreasonable, even under the deferential reasoning of
Kuhlmeier,223 the school administrator's actions cannot stand. If,
however, the school administrator's actions are deemed reasonable, it
will be necessary to proceed to step two.
This second step inquires into the reasonableness of the student's
conduct in light of a reasonable student standard. 224 The step two
question is: Would a reasonable student conduct himself or herself in
the manner in which the actual student conducted himself or herself in
light of all of the circumstances? As with step one, if the student's
220. One issue associated with advocating student empowerment is what happens if students
vote to suppress students' rights. A group of Washington state students voted on an initiative to
ban homosexual students from serving on the student council. See Gay Activists Assail Oregon
Vote, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 29, 1992, at B10. While the initiative failed, this highlights
the need on occasion, as the Arnold court demonstrated, for protecting substantive rights irre-
spective of the majority will. While students should be encouraged to express their views, and
these views should be considered, the views cannot be definitive on the issue.
221. See supra notes 110-42 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 6 for a definition of "reasonable educator."
223. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
224. See supra note 9 for a definition of "reasonable student."
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conduct is found to be unreasonable, the analysis ends and sanctions
against the student should stand. If, however, the student is found to
have conducted himself or herself reasonably, then it will be necessary
to proceed to step three.
Step three is the most difficult step. Two reasonable people-the
student and the school administrator-are in opposition to one an-
other. Each has behaved as his or her peers would act. The question
remains: Who should prevail? This is where a true balancing of inter-
ests is required. The approach most protective of students would re-
quire courts to use a heightened level of scrutiny of the school
administrator's actions analogous to that used by courts evaluating
limitations on suspect classes in Equal Protection cases. 225 I realize,
however, that this is unrealistic. Therefore, a mid-level judicial scru-
tiny, something approaching what one commentator describes as ra-
tional basis with a bite, 22 is more likely to be accepted by courts. 227
This mid-level scrutiny should produce a greater sphere of protected
students' rights than that found today. Hopefully, this level of scru-
tiny would not increase the number of judicial challenges to school
authority. Rather, if the Supreme Court were to adopt this higher
standard of review, it would be sending a message to school adminis-
trators to re-evaluate their actions and to take the interests of students
more seriously when determining whether to implement student res-
trictions. 28
A bright line test for step three is seemingly impossible. The issue of
students' rights is not one that is susceptible to absolutes. Given the
inevitable conflicts between students' desires and the educational mis-
225. See, e.g., Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
226. See Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAtv. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972) (recommending a new
level of scrutiny for equal protection cases, and noting that this new level of scrutiny "would
have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in
actuality, not merely in conjecture.").
227. This idea has been suggested before. See Dienes and Connolly, supra note 110, at 389-
92 (proposing a "weighed balancing" of interests as an alternative to formalistic judicial deci-
sion making). However, this proposed approach covers a broader range of student interests, and
more explicitly recognizes the interests to be balanced.
228. See id. at 385. ("Even though judicial action seldom provides definitive answers to con-
flicts, the threat of judicial intervention reshapes the dispute and becomes part of the give and
take of the dialogue."); see also Roe. supra note 59, at 1331:
Review of restrictions of student speech is particularly necessary because schools are
charged with teaching respect for democratic values, including [F]irst [Almendment
values. Therefore, courts have a responsibility to see that [Flirst [Almendment values
are maintained when school boards evaluate the educational suitability of student
speech because such evaluations may threaten the very values that schools have a duty
to teach.
Id. (footnote omitted).
STUDENTS' RIGHTS
sion, the circumstances of a given case necessarily will determine who
prevails. Admittedly, there will be few cases in which a fact finder will
conclude that under no circumstances could he or she find that the
school administrator or the student would be reasonable in acting in
the manner he or she acted. Cases which come immediately to mind
that might qualify include strip searches, drug testing, and weapons.
Slightly more difficult cases will be those in which the fact finder
must decide whether the actions of students or administrators are rea-
sonable in particular circumstances. The important point here is that
even if one finds the action of the school administrator is reasonable,
this should be only the beginning of the inquiry, not the end. A court
should be required to inquire further into the reasonableness of the
student's conduct or interest and expressly articulate what the offend-
ing conduct or interest is and why it is reasonable or unreasonable. At
a minimum, such an articulation subjects the court's opinion to scru-
tiny by appellate courts, commentators, and the general public. If any
of these groups is dissatisfied, appropriate remedial steps can be
taken. While this is less than the ideal unyielding baseline of students'
rights, it is far better than some of the conclusory court opinions that
do not bother to evaluate the student interest at all.2 29
A requirement that a court "gauge the reasonableness of questiona-
ble means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court,
rather than resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judi-
cial hypothesizing' '230 should be imposed. Assuming the student's in-
terest is reasonable, a court should further be required to balance it in
light of Tinker's material and substantial interference standard.2 11
Students and school administrators will disagree over what are
proper limits over speech, press, and privacy rights. Indeed, one stu-
dent might disagree with another student, and educators will disagree
among themselves. The critical idea is that both students' and school
administrators' interests be taken into account. Under today's
scheme, this balancing of interests is not occurring. Under the pro-
posal set forth here, school administrators and courts will be required
to articulate the relevant interests of schools and students and explain
why one outweighs the other.
229. Such a disinterest in students' rights is exactly what occurred in Fraser and Kuhimeier.
In Fraser, the Court based much of its reasoning on the potential harm to the younger students
and then concluded that the school board should make the ultimate determination of what con-
stitutes inappropriate speech. See 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1985). In Kuhimeier, the Court con-
cluded that as long as actions of the administrators were reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns they would be deferred to. See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1987).
230. Gunther, supra note 226, at 21.
231. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to present the status quo and a new vision of
the future with respect to students' rights. The status quo encom-
passes a legal standard that demands mere "reasonableness" when
evaluating students' constitutional rights, and as a result, the Supreme
Court has sanctioned an approach that gives great deference to school
administrators. The status quo also encompasses an activist school ad-
ministrator community that takes the Supreme Court's sword and
wields it wherever and whenever it can to force students to conform to
its notions of orthodoxy.
The status quo must take notice of students who are disillusioned,
angry, bitter, and rebellious. Students today generally face despair
and must confront the issues of sex, drugs, and violence at an earlier
age than previous generations.
While parents and schools must inculcate youth with certain values,
school administrators should include students in the selection of the
values to be instilled. The silencing movement has not silenced stu-
dents, and other puritanical and totalitarian methods have not
stopped students from acting on their desires. Only by embracing a
student-inclusive view and creating an environment where both stu-
dents and school administrators mutually respect each other, listen to
each other, and try to incorporate ideas espoused by each other, can
we hope to move toward a society that equally values students' rights
and educators' goals.
